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Signing Your Next Deal With Your Twitter
@Username: The Legal Uses of Identity-Based
Cryptography
Jillian Friedman*
I. INTRODUCTION
A multi-jurisdictional legal framework has been built over the past decade to
regulate electronic signatures and their use in evidence and to validate legal
writings. Technology innovates, and in the domain of signatures the potential of
identity-based cryptography excites the technology industry and academic
researchers.1 For centuries, cryptography has been an important tool in
political, military, and business communications to secure communication and
protect the secrecy of a message.2 Cryptography is premised on the use of
algorithms and keys to encrypt and decrypt messages. Depending on the system,
the same key can be used to encrypt and decrypt a message or there can be
separate keys for encryption and decryption.
Digital signatures rely on cryptography, a method of hiding or scrambling
the contents of a message. This scrambling or disguising is called encryption, the
resulting encrypted message is a cryptogram or ciphertext, and the return of the
ciphertext into plain text is called decryption.3 Public key encryption or public
key infrastructure cryptography (PKI) is a cryptographic scheme designed to
solve the problem of establishing secure communication between two parties
using a communication medium not under their exclusive control. Through a
PKI scheme, both the recipient and the sending party have a distinct ‘‘key.” The
sender’s key is used to encrypt the message and the recipient’s is used for
decryption. The concept of two separate keys as opposed to one was so
innovative that it gave rise to a paradigm shift in cryptography.
*
1

2
3

Author footnote information needed.
For example, Sanjit Chatterjee & Palash Sarkar, Identity-Based Encryption (New York:
Springer, 2011) [Chatterjee & Sarkar]; Dan Boneh & Matthew Franklin, ‘‘Identity-Based
Encryption from the Weil Pairing” (2003) 32(3) Siam J of Computing 586; Wikipedia
contributors, “ID-based cryptography,” online: Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia
<http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=ID-based_cryptography&oldid=634978063>.The concept of IBC was first published in 1985, Adi Shamir,
‘‘Identity-Based Cryptosystems and Signature Schemes: in George Robert Blakley &
David Chaum, eds, Advances in Technology, Vol. 196 (Spain: Spring Berlin Heideberg,
1985) 47-53 [Shamir]. Shamir is also an inventor of the RSA cryptosystem—one of the
first practical public key cryptosystems and widely used today to securely transmit data.
Chatterjee & Sarkar, supra note 1 at 1.
Stephen Mason, Electronic Signatures in Law (3rd edn, Cambridge University Press,
2012), 261-263; 280 at 259.
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The great potential of PKI for digital communications and signatures has yet
to be seen, and this novel scheme is not without flaws. Cryptographers have
struggled with the problem of attackers intercepting messages and replacing
them. Though this research is concerned with the digital world, the challenge of
authentication pre-dates the digital era. The question authentication poses is how
can a recipient know the message is from who it purports to be from? PKI schemes
attempt to solve the authentication problem through the use of Certification
Authorities (CA), trusted third parties who determine and verify the identity of a
party.4 The many problems associated with CAs, to be discussed at length, are
said to be the cause for the absence of widespread adoption of PKI schemes. 5
Identity-based cryptography (IBC) was developed in response to problems
associated with earlier PKI cryptographic schemes, namely those related to CAs
and authentication. IBC schemes do away with the need for a CA to verify the
public key and identity of a party by using the party’s identity as a public key.
IBC is a type of ‘‘public key encryption scheme where the public key of a user can
be any arbitrary string — typically an e-mail address” where the sender of a
message will encrypt the message using the email ID of the recipient as a public
key. IBC is seen as a scheme that solves and simplifies the authentication
problem in part, by obviating the need for a CA to verify the public key of the
recipient.6
This article will look at the legal framework for electronic signatures under
Canadian law and through the UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic
Signatures and evaluate the potential use of identity-based cryptography as a
type of electronic signature. While most jurisdictions permit electronic signatures
to replace their handwritten predecessors, the criteria of validity for an electronic
signature range from liberal to restrictive. Public key infrastructure (PKI)
cryptography schemes are considered to meet the juridical conditions of a legal
signature under more rigorous legislation that requires an electronic signature to
possess certain security attributes. In common law jurisdictions, digital signature
schemes such as PKI have not been widely adopted in the private sector for use
as secure electronic signatures. This may be due to the fact that they are difficult
and awkward for the general public to use, rather than because of doubts
surrounding certification authorities. This is not entirely the case in Europe and
Latin America, where PKI digital signature schemes have been adopted by
various governments programs. Case examples of PKI schemes include electronic
identity cards issued by European governments such as Belgium’s eID.7 Though
used by the government, the European private sector has widely neglected PKI
electronic signature products. This is partly due to a lack of customer demand. 8
4
5
6
7

Chatterjee & Sarkar, supra note 1 at 2-6.
Chatterjee & Sarkar, supra note 1 at 7.
Chatterjee & Sarkar, supra note 1, at 8.
See ‘‘The electronic identity documents,” online: eID <http://eid.belgium.be/en/
find_out_more_about_the_eid/the_electronic_identity_documents/>.
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Increasingly, people rely on the internet to transfer hypersensitive
information and digital assets. E-commerce continues to grow at a breakneck
pace, relying on third-party service providers and payment products such as
credit cards or payment processing services to provide security of data and to
ensure that there is no fraud. A secure digital signature scheme that is user
friendly may be a necessary ingredient for the success of nascent e-commerce
industries. New forms of transferring value online, such as cryptocurrency, place
much greater responsibility on the consumer or user to protect their assets and to
militate against fraud. Now, more than ever, people are alive to the fact that
their personal information, including email and bank account information, is not
safe from hackers. Identity based cryptography (IBC) can be used to create
digital signatures through a scheme that some believe has greater potential for
mass adoption and is even more secure than PKI.9
Looking at the law of electronic signatures in Canada and the United
Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) Model Law on
Electronic Signatures (2001), we will examine whether these laws permit digital
signatures using an identity-based cryptographic process.

II. ELECTRONIC SIGNATURES AND THEIR LEGAL
REQUIREMENTS
Not all contracts are required by law to be in writing. Unless otherwise
stipulated, a contract is validly formed between parties so long as the requisite
elements of offer, acceptance, intention to be bound, and consideration are
present. However, even unsophisticated business actors take the issue of validity
very seriously, and, as an ancillary, the validity of signatures. Furthermore, there
are many different types of contracts that are required by statute to be in writing.
Even though many types of contracts do not have requirements as to form in
Canadian and international law, there is a predisposition in practice and in law
towards recording the common intentions of the parties and endorsing it with a
signature.10 Unsurprisingly, most commercial transactions are reflected in some
form of writing.
For a signature affixed or applied to a writing to be valid in Canadian
common law, there are three conditions that it must possess. These are
8

9

10

Heiko Robnagel and Jan Zibuschka, ‘‘Integrating Qualified Electronic Signatures With
Password Legacy Systems” (2007) 4 Digital Evidence & Elec Signature L Rev 7; see also
Aniello Merone, ‘‘Electronic signatures in Italian law” (2014) 11 Digital Evidence & Elec
Signature L Rev 85.
Daniel Cawrey, ‘‘Keybase Project Plans to Make Cryptography as Easy as Twitter”,
online: Coindesk <www.coindesk.com/keybase-project-plans-make-cryptographyeasy-twitter/>; regarding the difficulties related to exchanging keys with the PKI
scheme see Stephen Mason, supra note 3.
Mark Lewis, ‘‘Digital Signatures : Meeting the Traditional Requirements Electronically
— A Canadian Perspective” (2002) 2 Asper Rev of Int’l Bus and Trade Law 63-84 at 2
[Lewis].
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authenticity, integrity, and non-repudiation. The same conditions must be
present for a contract executed in electronic form.11 History has demonstrated
that a signature can manifest in many forms and serve many functions. This can
also be said of electronic signatures, and it is therefore important to clarify what
is meant by electronic signatures and to distinguish the different formats that
electronic signatures can take. The term ‘‘electronic signature” broadly
encompasses anything digital that can be used for the purpose of indicating
that a signatory intended their signature to have a legal effect.12 Even manuscript
signatures that are scanned, stored on a computer, and later printed onto a
cheque have been considered sufficient electronic signatures. 13 Other examples of
electronic signatures include electronic sounds, typing a name in an electronic
document, clicking the ‘‘I accept” icon to confirm intention to enter a contract,
browse-wrap consent, and the use of personal identification numbers and
passwords. All of these actions have been considered to be electronic signatures
in various jurisdictions under legislation and case law.14

(a) Authentication, Integrity, and Non-Repudiation
One of the qualities of a handwritten signature is that it provides the
authenticity of the person using the signature. Most statutes on electronic
signatures require this feature, at a minimum.15 Each person’s signature is meant
to be unique, like a fingerprint. In principle, no one else should be capable of recreating the signature of an individual, though in practice we know that this is
not the case. One of the criticisms of electronic signatures is that they are not
inherently unique and can be easily copied. Anyone can type the name of a
person in place of a handwritten signature, and we have no way of knowing if the
person who typed the name was actually that person who has authority to sign
the writing.16 However, this has not prevented the widespread use of electronic
signatures, such as those mentioned above, that are lacking in this aspect.
Putting this reality aside, for any electronic signature scheme to be practical
it must be possible to have confidence in the identity of the signatory. 17 This step
of providing assurance that an asserted identity is valid for a given person is
referred to as authentication.18 The authenticating function of a signature pre11
12
13

14

15
16
17

Ibid at 3.
Mason, supra note 3 at 190.
Mason, supra note 3 at 190, citing Tedco Mgmt Svcs (PVT) Ltd. v. Grain Marketing
Board, 1996 (1) ZLR 109 (S.C.).
For a well-researched review of different forms of electronic signatures, the author
recommends Mason, supra note 3.
Mason, supra note 3 at 1.
Lewis, supra note 10 at 4.
Lewis, supra note 10 at 4; TJ Smedinghoff, ‘‘Electronic Contracts & Digital Signatures:
An Overview of Law and Legislation” (1999) 564 Prac L Inst/Pat, Copyrights,
Trademarks, and Literary Prop 560 at 147 [Smedinghoff].
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dates the electronic age. There are several ways to describe authentication and it
has been the topic of much academic discussion.19 One is ‘‘the process by which a
person or legal entity seeks to verify the validity or genuineness of a particular
piece of information.”20 Authentication is also the ‘‘formal assertion of validity,
such as the signing of a certificate.”21 Authentication can also be applied to the
need to verify identity. As Stephen Mason explains, the signature on a cheque
serves to authenticate by associating the name of the person on the cheque with
the person claiming authority to draw on the account named on the cheque. 22
Even before the use of handwritten signatures, various methods of
authentication existed, such as the use of objects, the sign of the cross, seals,
and witnesses.23 A chief function of a signature is to authenticate the identity of
the signatory. One of the main distinctions between public key encryption
cryptography schemes and identity-based cryptography schemes is the
authentication process.
Regardless of the technology used, signatures can have any number of
functions besides authentication. Assuring the integrity of the writing is another
important function of a signature. Signatures are used as evidence by providing
proof that the signatory approves and consents to the contents of a document or
writing.24 The integrity of a writing can be broken up into several aspects and a
distinction should be made between the text of a message and the identity and
authority of the signatory. Integrity of the text of the message relates to whether
the content of the message received is the same as the message that was sent. 25
Integrity of the signatory is concerned with whether a person can be identified as
having affixed a signature to the message. Satisfaction of this component will
depend on the purpose of the signature, which is determined by the writing
itself.26 There should be a high degree of inseparability between the instrument
and the signature itself.27
The third crucial function of a signature is non-repudiation. From a legal
perspective non-repudiation is the ‘‘assurance of the origin or delivery of data in
18

19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26

27

Barry Sookman, Computer, Internet, and Electronic Commerce Law, Chapter 10:
Electronic Contracting, (Toronto: Carswell, 2014), at p 2 [Sookman].
See, for further discussion, Mason, supra note 3.
Mason, supra note 3 at 1.
Mason, supra note 3 at 1.
Mason, supra note 3 at 2.
Mason, supra note 3 at 15.
Mason, supra note 3 at 9.
Ibid.
Mason, supra note 3, referencing D Bruce Farrend, ‘‘Policy Considerations Behind
Legislation Recognizing Electronic Signatures 1998”, online: Uniform Law Conference
of Canada <http://www.ulcc.ca/en/1998-halifax-ns/395-civil-section-documents/364policy-considerations-behind-legislation-recognizing-electronic-signatures-1998>.
Lewis, supra note 10 at 4.
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order to protect the sender against false denial by the recipient that the data has
been received, or to protect against false denial by the sender that the data has
been sent.”28 However, this definition is incorrect with respect to how it is used
by technicians and cryptographers to whom ‘‘nonrepudiation provides proof of
the integrity and origin of data that can be verified by a third party.” 29 The
difference, though nuanced, is important because there does not necessarily need
to be technical non-repudiation in the form of a sophisticated IT system for a
legal sense of non-repudiation to be met. Moreover, the presence of a nonrepudiation feature of a certain cryptographic scheme will not always provide for
non-repudiation in a legal sense. From a software engineering perspective, nonrepudiation is the binding of users and identities to specific actions such that
denial of the user demonstrates either deception or a failure to secure their
private key. In the legal context, there are a number of scenarios where a
signature can be repudiated. One example would be where a person’s username
or password is hacked. Just because a message is received from a username does
not mean that it was sent by the person associated with that username. 30
Similarly, manuscript signatures can be disputed on the basis of being forged, or
having been executed through fraud, error, or duress. Digital signatures provide
non-repudiation insofar as they confirm that a message was signed by a private
key. They do not necessarily prove that the individual who signed the key was the
individual alleged to control or have authority over that key.
The signature, manifested through different technologies over centuries,
continues to hold the same important functions as ever.31Whereas the abovementioned criteria of authenticity, integrity, and non-repudiation are based on
the practice of applying a signature by putting ink to paper, the same purpose
can be achieved by applying an electronic signature to a document by a process. 32
As mentioned, there are many forms of electronic signatures that may not
meet the above-mentioned criteria and yet are still recognized as valid signatures.
Take, for example, the act of typing a name in an electronic document. This
action does little to prove that the signature belongs to the party with the
authority to sign. Despite this, some American jurisdictions have confirmed that
the act of typing a name into a document on screen has been considered an
acceptable method of proving the intent of the signing party.33 Typed signatures
in email communications have also constituted signatures for the purpose of
28

29
30
31
32

Lewis, supra note 10 at 4; Electronic Commerce and Information Technology Division
Section of Science and Technology, Information Security Committee Digital Signature
Guidelines (DSG), Legal Infrastructure for Certification Authorities and Secure
Electronic Commerce (American Bar Association 1995, 1996) at 8 [ABA].
Mason, supra note 3 at 319.
Ibid.
Mason, supra note 3 at 1.
Donnie L Kidd, Jr & William H Daughtrey, Jr, ‘‘Adapting Contract Law to
Accommodate Electronic Contracts: Overview and Suggestions” (2000) 26 Rutgers
Computer & Tech LJ 215 at 253.
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certain juridical acts, such as the termination of a lease.34 Different types of
electronic signatures have been found to be valid in a variety of legal contexts,
including writings evidencing interest in property,35 commercial contracts,36 and
the relevant writing under the Statute of Frauds.37 The validity and probative
force of an electronic signature is evaluated in light of the form used, the nature
of the juridical act to which the signature is affixed, and all the surrounding
evidence. This is where technical and legal perceptions as to the trustworthiness
of an electronic signature diverge.
For technicians, there is a lack of trustworthiness associated with various
electronic signature forms as they fail to satisfy the technical criteria of
authentication, integrity, and non-repudiation. Different technical procedures
exist to ensure the three elements of authentication, integrity, and nonrepudiation. These include processes to ‘‘apply” an electronic signature in
order to overcome a perceived absence of the trustworthiness that exists with
paper-based signatures. These techniques or methods verify, from a technical
perspective, that an electronic signature or record is that of a specific person or
will ‘‘detect error or alteration in the communication, content, or storage of an
electronic record since a specific point in time.”38 What is known as a digital
signature is the procedure that is most widely used.

III. DIGITAL SIGNATURES
A form of electronic signature, a digital signature is a ‘‘mathematical scheme
for demonstrating the authenticity of a digital message or document.” 39
According to Mason, a digital signature is ‘‘data appended to, or a
cryptographic transformation of, a data unit that allows a recipient of the data
to prove the source and integrity of the data unit.”40 Cryptographic-based digital
signatures function to provide, from a technical point of view, authenticity,
integrity, and non-repudiation.41 Often, digital signatures use what is called
public key infrastructure to sign a message or document.
33

34
35
36

37

38
39

40
41

Mason, supra note 3 at 193; see Uniform Electronic Transactions Act, s 2(8) definition of
electronic signature, Official Comment 7.
Crestwood Shops, L.L.C. v. Hilkene, 197 S.W.3d 641 (Mo. App. W.D., 2006).
Faulks v. Cameron, [2004] NTSC 61, 32 Fam. L.R. 417 (Northern Territory S.C.).
Computer Sky Edv. v. Prime Medical Company Ltd. (August 4, 2005), Doc. 29488/04
(Tel-Aviv Peace Court); Mason, supra note 3 at 197.
Polyad Company v. Indopco Inc., 2007 WL 2893638 (N.D. Ill. E.D., 2007); Leoppky v.
Meston, 2008 ABQB 45, 2008 CarswellAlta 60 (Alta. Q.B.); Golden Ocean Group Ltd. v.
Salgaocar Mining Industries Pvt Ltd., [2012] 3 All E.R. 842 (Eng. C.A.).
Lewis, supra note 10 at 5; Smedinghoff, supra note 17 at 144.
David J Bilinsky, ‘‘Signed, sealed and delivered. . .online” (2006) 26:24 The Lawyers
Weekly.
Mason, supra note 3 at 189.
Mason, supra note 3 at 259.
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(a) Public/Private Key Infrastructure
Asymmetric cryptosystems, referred to as public key encryption, or public
key infrastructure (PKI) are security infrastructure with a number of components
and services.42 PKI was developed to facilitate secure communications between
numerous untrusted parties. It is distinct from symmetric cryptosystems,
whereby parties share the same key for encryption and decryption—such
systems are used by banks and their customers through a personal identification
number (PIN).43 Symmetric cryptographic systems are best suited for closed user
groups with a strong degree of trust, as the senders and recipients use the same
key. One of the weaknesses of a symmetric cryptosystem is that the security of
the entire system depends on the secrecy of the secured shared key.44
It is important to understand the basic concepts of PKI in order to evaluate
their legal classification. Cryptography in general operates by processing data in
the form of binary digits and performing functions on this data. This tool allows
for data, such as secret messages, to be transformed into an alternate
representation that is unique to the original message.45 Traditional digital
signature methods involve two keys assigned to the signing party: a public key
and a private key. The public key is the key used to identify the individual. The
private key is held by the individual party and must not be shared or disclosed.
Using their private key, a signatory encrypts their signature. The result is a
digital signature. The recipient of the encrypted message uses the public key to
decrypt the message (or signature). Only the public key can unscramble the
encrypted message.
Two algorithms are used to create a digital signature: a hash algorithm and a
signature algorithm. The hash function is an ‘‘algorithm which creates a digital
representation or ‘fingerprint’ in the form or a ‘hash value’ or ‘hash result’ of a
standard length which is usually much smaller than the message but nevertheless
substantially unique to it.”46 This formula is sent to the recipient. Each message
has a specific hash value such that if the original message were to be modified,
the hash value would necessarily change. The hash function is applied to the
original message to create a resulting set of data—a set of digits unique to the
message—called a message digest. The signature algorithm, also referred to as
the private key, is applied to the message digest and creates the digital
signature.47
42

43

44
45
46

Carlisle Adams & Steve Lloyd, Understanding PKI: Concepts, Standards, and Deployment Considerations, 2nd ed (Boston: Addison-Wesley, 2003) at 35.
For a more detailed description of PKI and public/private keys see Carlisle Adams &
Steve Lloyd, ibid; Bruce Schneier, Applied Cryptography Protocols, Algorithms, and
Source Code in C, 2nd ed (Indiana: Wiley Publishing, 1996); Niels Ferguson and Bruce
Schneier, Practical Cryptography (Indiana: Wiley Publishing, 2003).
Mason, supra note 3 at 261.
Lewis, supra note 10.
ABA, supra note 28; Lewis, supra note 10 at 6.
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When these algorithms are applied, the message changes. The recipient of the
digital signature decrypts the message with the public key. When a public key is
applied to a digital signature it gives a message digest that is identical to the
message digest produced by the hash function to the original message.48 Put
simply, a message is encrypted with the private key and decrypted with the public
key by the recipient. If the message is changed or altered in any way, it will be
known because the hash value will change. The following is an example of a
message sent using public key cryptography:
(a) David and Joseph want to exchange encrypted messages.
(b) David generates a public and private key with a software on his computer
and gives Joseph the public key. David keeps his private key a secret.
(c) Joseph writes a message and encrypts it using David’s public key, and
sends it.
(d) David decrypts Joe’s message using his private key.49
The relative strengths and weaknesses of different types of cryptographybased digital signatures will depend on how a particular system, its algorithms,
and its ciphers work.50 From a technical point of view, digital signatures
generated through a PKI scheme by design satisfy most of the functions of a
traditional handwritten signature with one exception. There is no way to be sure
that the holder of the private key that signs the encrypted message is who he says
he is. These problems emanate from how a person creates and controls their keys.
It is possible for a message between parties to be intercepted, modified, or deleted
if a third party intercepts a public key exchange and imposes himself as one of the
parties. PKI uses certification authorities, also called the ‘‘Web of Trust” to solve
this dilemma.51 As will be discussed, this model leaves much to be desired.

(i) Certification Authority
In order for people to believe that your public key belongs to you, you can
upload it to a key server and have other trusted people, often referred to as
certifying authorities (CA), sign it with their own keys.52 The role of the CA is to
certify the correspondence or association between a public key and the alleged
owner of the associated private key by digitally signing a certificate. The
certificate issued by the certification authority will identify the certification
authority, identify the subscriber and the subscriber’s public key, and be signed
with the CA’s private key.53
47
48
49
50
51

52

Lewis, supra note 10 at 6.
Ibid.
Example derived from Mason, supra note 3 at 263.
Mason, supra note 3 at 261.
Klint Finley, ‘‘OkCupid’s Founders Want to Bring Encrypted Email to the Masses”
online: Wired <http://www.wired.com/2014/04/keybase/> [Finley].
An example of this is the MIT PGP Public Key Server, online: <https://pgp.mit.edu/>.
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CAs must be trusted to play such an important role.54 When verifying that a
signature comes from the person it is supposed to, a recipient can check to see if a
trusted CA has signed the person’s authentication certification. A recipient can
even verify one step further and check that a trusted CA has signed the
certification of that trusted CA.55 Certifying authorities are used to ensure that
an assigned digital signature belongs to who it is supposed to. This service is
necessary for the PKI method to be truly ‘‘trustworthy” and to achieve the
authentication requirement. A sender will send their signed message as well as the
CA certificate with their message, and both the digital signature of the sender
and that of the CA can be verified.
Many are of the view that a digital signature using the above-described PKI
methods with successful authentication ensures the integrity of the corresponding
message and signature.56 By certifying the connection between a person or legal
entity and their public key the CA adds confidence that the associated signatory
actually signed the message.57 For this reason, digital signature schemes using
PKI are commonly used to meet the legal requirements for electronic signatures
under stricter electronic signature laws.
Important challenges resonate with relying on trusted third-party
certification authorities. Though certain bodies, such as the European
Telecommunications Standards Institute, have set out the requirements that a
CA should comply with when confirming the identity of a person or entity, it is
not always clear what the obligations of certification authorities are in
connection with the issuance of digital certificates.58 Furthermore, certification
authorities can issue false certificates if their identity verification is not rigorous
enough.59
A critical analysis of digital signatures would not be complete without
returning to the important nuances between the technical and legal concepts of
non-repudiation as they apply to digital signatures. PKI digital signatures are
perceived to provide greater security than other electronic signature schemes.
Because of this apparent security, a subscribing party is convinced to take
responsibility for every use of their private key, thus attributing to the system a
non-repudiation property. This non-repudiation element is somewhat misleading
from a legal perspective. While the system does assure that a certain message was
signed with a certain private key, the subscribing party is not immune from
53
54

55
56
57
58
59

Mason, supra note 3 at 264.
Christoph Sorge, ‘‘The Legal Classification of Identity-Based Signatures,” University of
Paderborn, Germany, online at: Cryptology ePrint Archive <https://eprint.iacr.org/
2013/271.pdf> [Sorge].
Finley, supra note 51.
Lewis, supra note 10.
Sorge, supra note 54; Lewis, supra note 10; Mason, supra note 3 at 265.
Mason, supra note 3 at 275; Sookman, supra note 18 at 2.
For more details see Mason, supra note 3 at 274-284.
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attacks that would result in theft or misappropriation of the private key, or
corruption of the computer terminal that is used to sign with the private key. 60
Email is susceptible to fraud and hacking and it always has been. Over the
last few years businesses and individuals have grown aware of the fact that their
email is less secure than previously thought. PKI is a potential solution to these
security weaknesses. A private key can be used to ‘‘sign” messages to provide
proof it was really you that signed them. In business transactions among small
and medium enterprises it is normal to use email to communicate and negotiate
terms and conditions of important commercial agreements. However, PKI is not
widely used to encrypt messages and sign documents outside of the
cryptographer enthusiast world because it is hard to use. It is difficult to keep
your private key safe and the consequences of a hacker taking your private key
and impersonating you can be grave, especially because of the implied nonrepudiation that accompanies use of a digital signature scheme. The other
problem relates to the public key, which is necessary to know in order to send a
message to someone. The scheme is impractical because we cannot encrypt our
signature without knowing the public key of the recipient—which is a long string
of data bits and impractical to remember. Take note, however, that not all digital
signature schemes are the same and certain methods are of great interest in the
cryptography and business world, not least because they may be easier to adopt
than the PKI signature schemes.

(b) Identity Based Cryptography
The necessity of the CA to authenticate in digital signature schemes has been
much maligned.61 However, not all cryptographic signature schemes involve a
CA. Thirty years ago, world-renowned Israeli cryptographer Adi Shamir
presented an idea called identity based cryptography (IBC). 62 This
cryptographic-based solution partially solved the problem of retrieving
certificates and public keys that are required with the PKI model. 63 The IBC
scheme, wrote Shamir, enables ‘‘any pair of users to communicate securely and
to verify each other’s signatures without exchanging private or public keys,
without keeping key directories, and without using the services of a third
party.”64 The scheme requires the existence of trusted key generation centers that
exist uniquely to give each user a personalized ‘‘smart card” or key when they
join the network, thus eliminating the need for a CA.65 The ‘‘smart card” allows
a user to sign and encrypt messages, including signatures, and to decrypt and
verify the messages he receives.
60
61
62
63
64
65

Mason, supra note 3 at 266.
Lewis, supra note 10 at 2; Sookman, supra note 18 at 2; Mason, supra note 3 at 274-284.
Shamir, supra note 1.
Sorge, supra note 54 at 2.
Shamir, supra note 1 at 47.
Ibid.
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There are two powerful ideas behind IBC that are germane to electronic
signatures in the age of online commerce. The first is that the IBC system does
not generate a random pair of public/private keys and then publishes one of them
(the public key). Rather, the user chooses his name and network address as his
public key. The name and network address used can be anything. Shamir, writing
before social media, explained a user can use ‘‘any combination of name, social
security number, street address, office number or telephone number.” 66
Today what this means is that a person can use their social media
accounts—such as a Twitter or Facebook profile—an email address, and even
certain biometrics as their public key. This makes it extremely easy for anyone to
find them and communicate with them. In the world of e-commerce, the linking
of one’s identity to their social media profiles has become an accepted practice. 67
It is commonplace to open an account online and have the option of signing in
with your Twitter or Facebook account. This scheme simplifies the
cryptographic elements of electronic signatures because it can be used and
understood by people who know nothing about cryptographic protocols. 68
The second disruptive idea with the IBC scheme is also derived from the use
of personally identifying information as a public key. The identity-based scheme
links the message with the identifying information of the user and ownership of
the ‘‘smart card” ties it to the physical user. The key criteria for which personal
information is used is that the information ‘‘identifies the user in a way he cannot
later deny, and that it is readily available to the other party.”69 Thus, a degree of
non-repudiation is available. The IBC scheme answers the quagmire as to how to
prove that a person sending a message is who he says he is by requiring their
public key to be associated with their online identity. For example, a person with
a Facebook account who posts comments and personal photos and interacts with
connections cannot easily claim that this Facebook profile is not theirs. The
recipient of the message would just as easily be able to verify that the person is
who he says he is by checking the identifying information. Current services
experimenting with IBC cross-verify the identity of the user in different ways, one
of which is requiring a user to post a tweet linking back to their IBC user
profile.70
This IBC scheme is no panacea and is not above security failures. If a
person’s online identity is completely taken over, then legal non-repudiation is
compromised. One security advantage of IBC that militates against
impersonators is that the attacker would have to infiltrate a number of social
identities of a specific person, such as their Facebook, Twitter, and LinkedIn
account. It would be more difficult, though not impossible, for the attacker to
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keep up the façade that they are the individual whose account they have taken
over because they would have to maintain the authenticity of their victim
through posts and photos that purport to be from the legitimate account holder.
Shamir wrote that the IBC scheme can even be used by countries as the basis
for a new type of personal identification cards with which everyone can sign
cheques and legal documents electronically. Identity-based cryptography
schemes are similar to sending mail by the post—you can send someone a
message if you know their name and address and, in principle, only the recipient
can read the letter addressed to him. For example:
(a) Joseph wants to send a message to David.
(b) Joseph signs the message with his private key and then encrypts it by using
David’s name, which could be his Twitter username, and network address.
(c) Joseph then adds his name and network address to the message and sends
it to David. Upon receipt of the message, David decrypts it using his secret
key. David himself can verify Joseph’s signature by using Joseph’s name
and network address as a verification tool.71
One might argue that IBC does not completely eliminate the need for a
trusted third party; it simply shifts this trust to another party, a Private Key
Generator (PKG). This is an important distinction from PKI. With an IBC
scheme, private or secret keys are computed by a private key generation center
instead of by users themselves. The reason for this is because if users could
generate their own private keys, as is done with PKI schemes, user Allison could
generate a private key corresponding with the public profile of Allison, but she
could also generate one for the public profiles of Pamela and Kayla. The Private
Key Generator generates all the private keys for users in a network. The PKG
possesses privileged information, such as the algorithms that enable it to
compute the secret keys. The PKGs are also responsible for thoroughly checking
the identity of a person before issuing ‘‘smart cards” or registrations to the user.
Users must also take care to prevent loss, duplication, or unauthorized use of
their cards.72 Notably, the PKGs role is a one-off; once the keys are generated
there is no need for a PKG and their utility ceases to exist. This is different from
certification authorities that must always stay vigilant and sign certificates and
will thus always be a cost of using the PKI system.
Real-life examples of IBC include Keybase.io, a website as well as an open
source command line program that uses the IBC scheme. It is a service that
allows users to obtain a public key using their social media profiles. The site is an
online directory that lets a user instantly locate someone online and trade the
information needed to allow them to send private encrypted messages to each
other.73 Instead of the ‘‘Web of Trust” system that requires reliance on trusted
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CAs, Keybase verifies the identity of the key holder by using the social Internet
as a cross-referencing tool.74 By placing your public key ‘‘signature” on your
blog or twitter account, you can prove ownership of the key. This system is much
harder to hack, as it would also require hacking all the social media and websites
associated with that individual. As long as a sender is confident that a twitter
account belongs to and is controlled by the person they are looking for, they can
have confidence in the signature associated with that name. It allows users to
search for others and will provide search results linking to someone’s social
media usernames, such as their Twitter username. By putting the social media
username into a command line, the program will confirm the public key is owned
by the associated Twitter user. Keybase can also provide the public bitcoin
address associated with the person, which is signed by her private key.75 The
service is still in its alpha phase but has generated excitement about the use of
identity to promulgate the popular adoption of cryptographic-based signatures.
The PKI and IBC techniques differ in how they go about authenticating the
identity of the holder of a key pair. These cryptographic approaches must be
understood from a legal perspective in order to determine whether and how
different types of digital signatures can be considered under different legal
classifications of electronic signatures.

IV. LEGAL CLASSIFICATION OF IDENTITY BASED
CRYPTOGRAPHIC SIGNATURES
Laws that address electronic signatures attempt to articulate what constitutes
a legal signature in the age of the Internet and all things digital. Most legal
definitions of an electronic signature are purposefully vague and do not refer to
any cryptographic scheme to achieve validity because they are technologically
neutral. Therefore, under these broad strokes definitions, an identity-based
crypto-signature will usually qualify as an electronic signature. However, some
legislation is more specific as to its classification of electronic signatures, and it is
these more rigorous specifications that are of interest. The legislative approaches
to electronic signatures can be divided into three categories: technology neutral;
semi-specific; and those requiring use of a digital signature by cryptographic
means.76 Another categorization describes these approaches as prescriptive,
minimalist, and two-tier.
Technology neutral statutes are broadly worded so as to give legal effect to
any electronic signature. These laws leave it to the courts to determine the
probative value of an electronic signature based on the security of the technology
used.77 An example is the United States federal law entitled the Electronic
Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act (E-SIGN Act). The E-SIGN
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Act regulates the legal effect of electronic signatures in interstate and foreign
commerce. This law defines an electronic signature as ‘‘an electronic sound,
symbol, or process, attached to or logically associated with a contract or other
record and executed or adopted by a person with the intent to sign the record.” 78
This minimalist approach has been widely adopted in common law
jurisdictions.79
Semi-specific statutes provide specifications as to the security attributes that
a valid electronic signature must have without requiring use of a particular
technology. However, the semi-specific statutes often require security attributes
found with PKI schemes.80 The third category of laws requires the use of PKI
digital signatures and usually in these cases the government is involved in
creating the certifying authority. For example, Latin American states have
licensing systems for certification authorities. 81

(a) UNCITRAL
For many countries, the legal approach to understanding electronic
signatures is the UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Signatures (2001)
(UNCITRAL Model).
According to the UNCITRAL Model an electronic signature is:
‘‘data in electronic form in, affixed to or logically associated with, a
data message, which may be used to identify the signatory in relation to
the data message and to indicate the signatory’s approval of the
information contained in the data message”.82

UNCITRAL provides that the requirement to provide a signature is met if
the electronic signature used is ‘‘as reliable as was appropriate for the purpose for
which the data message was generated or communicated, in the light of all the
circumstances, including any relevant agreement.”83 Reliability of the signature
is achieved if:
(a) The signature creation data are, within the context in which they are used,
linked to the signatory and to no other person;
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(b) The signature creation data were, at the time of signing, under the control
of the signatory and of no other person;
(c) Any alteration to the electronic signature, made after the time of signing, is
detectable; and
(d) Where a purpose of the legal requirement for a signature is to provide
assurance as to the integrity of the information to which it relates, any
alteration made to that information after the time of signing is detectable.84
[emphasis added]
The concept of an electronic signature under UNCITRAL requires that the
technology is able to identify the signatory.85 This is another iteration of the
authentication requirement. Similar to PKI, there is no inherent identity
authentication feature with IBC signatures since the public key can technically
be associated with any arbitrary text or identity information. 86 Nonetheless, with
IBC the sender’s full name and other personally identifying information can be
associated with their identity, as this data is their ‘‘public key.” It is possible to
identify the signatory insofar as it is possible to identify the individual by their
Twitter and Facebook account that they use as the public key. Therefore, it is
likely that an IBC electronic signature can satisfy the identity condition of a basic
electronic signature under the UNCITRAL definition.
Paragraphs (c) and (d) of the UNCITRAL definition of a reliable signature
stipulate that the scheme used must ensure that any alteration to the electronic
signature and the contents of the message must be detectable.87 This is necessary
to assure the integrity of the document. This requirement is fulfilled by both the
PKI and IBC schemes because this quality is intrinsic to any cryptographic
signature scheme.88 As mentioned above, the hash value that encrypts messages
is unique to the specific message and signature encrypted. If the original message,
including the signature, were to ever be modified, even by one character, the hash
value would necessarily change and render the alteration detectable. This feature
is present with both PKI and IBC cryptography schemes.
A reliable electronic signature requires a mapping or linking between the
signature and identity of the signatory that is unique to that person and solely
controlled by him. Article 6(3)(a)(b) of the UNCITRAL Model provides:
An electronic signature is considered to be reliable for the purpose of
satisfying the requirement referred to in paragraph 1 if:
(a) The signature creation data are, within the context in which they are
used, linked to the signatory and to no other person;
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(b) The signature creation data were, at the time of signing, under the
control of the signatory and of no other person89.

A simple scan of a handwritten signature will not suffice as a reliable
electronic signature because we have no way of knowing who actually signed it.90
Nor is the legal requirement to link to identity a readily available function of the
general framework of cryptographic signature schemes. With a PKI scheme this
requirement is fulfilled by the CA, and by the linking to verified personal
identifying information with an IBC scheme.
An important part of the reliable electronic signature category is the concept
of ‘‘sole control.” The UNCITRAL Model requires that a reliable electronic
signature be under the sole control of the signatory. Specifically, the signature
creation data must be, at the time of signing, under the control of the signatory
and of no other person.91 This means that for an IBC signature system, the
private key must stay in the control of the user. The same applies to a PKI
scheme. There is a human element to this requirement that technical
sophistication cannot eliminate. If a person loses or shares their private key
information with others then they are no longer in sole control of their private
key, which is part of the signature creation data. However, like other
cryptographic schemes, IBC provides the signatory with the ability to exclude
anyone else from signing.92
Several authors have identified problems associated with the ‘‘sole control”
concept, which directly relates to the security of signature creation. 93 From a
technical perspective, sole control implies that the signatory can prevent others
from using his signature creation data. In his legal analysis of IBC signatures, Dr.
Christoph Sorge rightly points out that IT systems are far too complex to
guarantee from a technical perspective that security measures are never
circumvented.94 Note that the UNCITRAL Model definition does not require
that the signature creation data be created by the signatory. Therefore, the
signatory does not necessarily have to generate the valid signature or private key,
only exclusively control it. If it were required that the signatory generate the
private key which he subsequently controls, then IBC would not be a valid form
of reliable electronic signature because the private keys are generated by a PKG
and not the signatory.95
If the ‘‘sole control” provision is to apply to the general cryptographic
scheme as well as the overall security of the context, then a cryptographic scheme
would have to be structured in a way so that only the legitimate signatory can
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generate a valid signature. This requirement articulates the subtle difference
between traditional PKI signature schemes and identity-based cryptographic
schemes. If the PKG is a central authority that generates the key, then it may also
be the case that a PKG can generate signatures for any identity. The existence of
the PKG may leave open the possibility for another person, other than the
original signatory, to sign messages valid for the same identity. 96 This scenario
would fail under the sole control test. If this were the case, IBC signature schemes
could not generate signatures that meet the reliable electronic signature
requirements under the UNCITRAL Model. Note that the notion and
requirement of sole control presents itself differently depending on the
legislation, and the analysis with respect to different digital signature schemes,
will vary accordingly. Furthermore, an IBC digital signature scheme would likely
still be considered an electronic signature under the more liberal definitions cited
above, such as the E-Sign Act.
Dr. Sorge rounds out concerns related to ‘‘sole control” and the PKG in
several ways. One relies on the general liability rules of civil law. Just as is the
case with certification authorities who can also generate new keys pairs and
corresponding identities, there are serious legal liabilities for the PKG or CA
who act with negligence or malevolence. In order to comply with this element of
the law, the PKG must be able to delete its records of the private keys it
generates.97 If a PKG can delete the key immediately after giving it to the
subscriber and if it cannot subsequently re-generate the key, then the signatory
truly has ‘‘sole control,” at least in a technical sense. The scheme must be
structured in a way that the PKG is never able to retrieve or regenerate the
private keys it created. According to the literature there are a number of identitybased cryptographic schemes that achieve the criteria of sole control of the
private key using different techniques.98 Finally, there must be a way to
distinguish between signatures generated by the PKG and those generated using
an original private key given to the subscriber. Sorge goes on to discuss a number
of other workable technical solutions that help put the concern about ‘‘sole
control” to rest.99
Even secure cryptographic schemes are vulnerable to what is referred to as a
‘‘key substitution attack.” This is when a second public key is generated which
links to a second entity but for which the same private key signature will be
valid.100 In this case person B can create another public key associated with
person C but which person B really controls via his private key. One prevention
tool for this is the use of certification authorities to include with the message to
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be signed. For an IBC scheme, as Sorge explains, ‘‘a successful key substitution
attack on an identity based signature scheme implies that a signature is valid for
more than one identity; an attacker could thus retrieve the private key of one
identity and, via the key substitution attack, get a second identity for which the
signature is valid.”101
At the risk of being overly technical, resisting attacks of the nature of the key
substitution attack are part of the design objectives of identity-based signature
schemes and the problem is the same, if not greater, with PKI. With PKI, a
dishonest CA can impersonate a user by generating a certificate binding that
users’ identity information with the newly generated secret key.102An identitybased signature is linked to the identity of the signor through data that only
belongs to the signor, like their phone number and social media account. This
link is authenticated by the PKG. In the same sense that a CA could impersonate
users, it is within contemplation that the PKG might generate another person
aside from the original signatory with the ability to sign messages valid for the
same identity.103 Assuming the PKG is not malevolent, and does not assign the
same private key to more than one signatory, the link to the signatory
requirement under the UNCITRAL Model is met. Furthermore, technical
solutions to this challenge are within the realm of possibility.
From this preliminary analysis it is possible to conclude that identity-based
signature schemes are capable of fulfilling the requirements of a ‘‘reliable
electronic signature” as defined in the UNCITRAL Model. In his paper, which
focused on the European Union and Germany, Sorge arrives at the same
conclusion by way of analysis of the European Signature Directive requirements
for advanced electronic signatures, which is a more restrictive set of criteria. 104

(b) Canada (PIPEDA)
In Canada, private law matters are the jurisdiction of the provinces but, as
certain federal laws also address electronic signatures, the area has a double
aspect.105 Canadian law falls within the technology neutral and semi-specific
electronic signature law classifications. This policy approach is criticized by some
as putting unneeded pressure on the courts and the private sector to determine
which technology provides adequate security for an electronic signature to have
evidentiary value.106 However, an advantage of this legislative strategy is that is
leaves room for technological innovation that might otherwise be barred by
overly-specific legislation.
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Most Canadian provincial and federal legislation that defines an electronic
signature are substantially similar as they are drawn from the same source, the
Uniform Electronic Commerce Act (UECA) prepared by the Uniform Law
Conference of Canada in 1998 to implement the principles of the UNCITRAL
Model.107 An electronic signature is defined in Ontario’s Electronic Commerce
Act as ‘‘electronic information that a person creates or adopts in order to sign a
document and that is in, attached to or associated with the document.” 108 These
provisions allow for any method to be used to electronically ‘‘sign” a document,
and do not necessarily require a cryptographic scheme to achieve validity. This is
interpreted to mean that any electronic activity that is intended by the signatory
to be a signature will be considered as such.109 Therefore, we can safely posit that
a signature based on IBC would meet the definition of electronic signature under
most Canadian provincial laws. Note, however, that the province of Quebec has
a different approach to electronic signatures. As such, Quebec law as it pertains
to electronic signatures has not been analyzed herein.
As mentioned, Canadian laws do not explicitly require the use of a specific
digital signature technology for an electronic signature to be valid. The probative
value of these signatures is left to the courts to evaluate. This is distinct from the
approach taken by some European laws such as Germany’s Signature Act, which
specifically requires certain digital schemes in order to achieve legal validity for
some electronic signatures.110 One place where Canadian law is semi-specific as
to the technology required is the federal Personal Information Protection and
Electronic Documents Act (PIPEDA), which distinguishes between an electronic
signature and a secure electronic signature.111
Article 31 of PIPEDA provides a definition of a secure electronic signature
which implicitly requires the use of digital signature technology. 112 Under
PIPEDA a secure electronic signature ‘‘means an electronic signature that results
from the application of a technology or process prescribed by regulations made
under subsection 48(1).”113 Section 48(1) states:
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48. (1) Subject to subsection (2), the Governor in Council may, on the
recommendation of the Treasury Board, make regulations prescribing
technologies or processes for the purpose of the definition ‘‘secure
electronic signature” in subsection 31(1).
Characteristics
(2) The Governor in Council may prescribe a technology or process
only if the Governor in Council is satisfied that it can be proved that
(a) the electronic signature resulting from the use by a person of the
technology or process is unique to the person;
(b) the use of the technology or process by a person to incorporate,
attach or associate the person’s electronic signature to an electronic
document is under the sole control of the person;
(c) the technology or process can be used to identify the person using the
technology or process; and
(d) the electronic signature can be linked with an electronic document in
such a way that it can be used to determine whether the electronic
document has been changed since the electronic signature was
incorporated in, attached to or associated with the electronic
document.114

The characteristics that a technology or process would have to possess for a
valid secure electronic signature under PIPEDA are the same as those provided
by public key encryption, or PKI.115 We will now examine whether the
characteristics of identity-based cryptography are also within the scope of the
PIPEDA definition of secure electronic signature.
The first requirement is that the signature must be unique to the user whose
identity is associated with the signature. This requirement is somewhat similar to
that of UNCITRAL’s Model Law article 6(3)(a) which requires that there be a
link between the signatory and the signature (or signature creation data), which
must be exclusively controlled by the signatory. Barring any key substitution
attack, as discussed above, in principle, the private key generated by the PKG
should be exclusively associated with the signatory’s public profile or personally
identifying information. In fact, IBC facilitates this by relying on the individual
signatory’s personal information to create a public key profile. In practice, PKGs
should not generate the same private key twice. Most IBC schemes rely on a
secure random number generator to generate private keys. While it is
theoretically possible to accidentally generate the same key pair for two
persons, this likelihood is negligible.116 The PIPEDA definition is less strict than
that of UNCITRAL as it does not appear to require that the signature creation
data be exclusively linked to the signatory, just that it be unique to the signatory.
This seems to impose less restrictive obligation on the PKG vis-à-vis the
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destruction of the private keys it generates. As with the UNCITRAL Model
Law, IBC satisfies this requirement by generating only one private key to pair
with a person’s identity profile.
The signatory must have the sole control of the technology used to associate
a signature to an electronic document.117 In the case of PKI and IBC
crypography this means that a user must be in the sole possession and control
of their private key. This appears to be the same criteria as UNCITRAL’s
reliable electronic signature. As discussed above, an IBC signature scheme can
achieve this in a system whereby the PKG destroys its copy of the private key of
the user once it has generated it and provided it to the user. The signatory must
be responsible for ensuring that he does not share his private key with anyone.
The third criteria for a secure electronic signature under PIPEDA is that the
technology or process used can be used to identify the person using the
technology.118 With PKI, this condition is met with the certification authorities.
There is an important nuance in the PIPEDA text lacking from the
corresponding UNCITRAL definition. PIPEDA requires that it be possible for
the technology used to identify the person, not that the technology must, without
fail, identify the person accurately. However, identity-based cryptography is, by
its very nature, concerned with authenticating the identity of the person
associated with the signatory. With the ability to cross reference a number of
personally identifying characteristics of an individual, including social media
accounts, the PKG can verify the true identity of the signatory and easily satisfies
this requirement.
The fourth criteria of the secure electronic signature deals with integrity of
the electronic document associated with the signature.119 As discussed above,
private and public key encryption, including PKI and IBC, is premised on the
goal of discerning even the smallest of changes to an encrypted message. This is
done via the hash function, which will indicate if there has been any alteration to
a message once it has been encrypted with the hash algorithm.
Under the general technology-neutral provincial law definitions of electronic
signatures120 as well as pursuant to the more rigorous ‘‘secure electronic
signature” under PIPEDA, digital signatures using identity-based cryptography
schemes would qualify as legally valid electronic signatures.

V. CONCLUSION
This article is intended to be a preliminary assessment of the legal elements of
identity-based cryptography. It begs questions relating to the probative force of
different cryptographic signature schemes as well as privacy law implications of
using social Internet profiles to identify individuals. Also of relevance are the
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private international law issues regarding cross-border transactions executed
using electronic signatures which, as we have seen, have differing legal
requirements depending on the jurisdiction.
Cryptography has long been thought of as the closest thing humans have to a
superpower. This superpower continues to creep into the mainstream. However,
a number of caveats, including user adoption and inefficiencies related to
authenticity, prevent its arrival on main-street. As one cryptographer laments,
‘‘Authenticity is the crown jewel of getting crypto right.” 121 It may not be long
before social Internet profiles and other personally identifying information are
leveraged to solve both the user adoption and authenticity problems. One is left
to ask: How many more data breaches must occur before people start taking
their online data security seriously? A technology linked to the social media
interfaces that our society has grown accustomed to and trustworthy of, and that
satisfies the signature requirements of authentication, integrity, and nonrepudiation, might just be the right mix for the next wave of e-commerce, such
as cryptocurrency business models, to take off.
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